

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06206 01 OF 02 141306Z

46

ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 AF-08 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 NEAE-00 SSM-03 DHA-02

ORM-02 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00

PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01

SP-02 SS-15 SAM-01 SAB-01 ACDA-07 OMB-01 SY-05 SCA-01

SCCT-01 A-01 OPR-02 OC-06 CCO-00 /117 W

----- 007061

O R 141004Z JUL 76

FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1099

INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

USINT BAGHDAD

AMEMBASSY MANAMA

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY MUSCAT

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY RABAT

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

AMEMBASSY TUNIS

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

USCINCEUR

USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 6206

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 06206 01 OF 02 141306Z

USCINCEUR FOR POLAD

USDOCSOUTH FOR STODDART, INTAFF

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, LE, PINS, PINT, MILI

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE SILVER LINING IN CONNECTION WITH CURRENT
LEBANESE SITUATION

1. SUMMARY. DESPITE GENERAL VIEW--WITH WHICH WE ARE IN AGREEMENT--THAT THERE IS PROBABLY LITTLE LIKELIHOOD OF EARLY IMPROVEMENT IN LEBANESE SITUATION, THERE ARE SOME NEW ELEMENTS IN PICTURE WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY OFFER WAY OUT OF CURRENT IMPASSE. THESE ELEMENTS ARE (1) UNCHARACTERISTIC ISRAEL RESTRAINT VIS-A-VIS FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTION IN LEBANON; (2) POSSIBLE SYRIAN DESIRE FOR PEACE SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL AND THUS POSTWTOTJQ#THOUGH HIGHLY SPECULATIVE) COMCOMITANT SYRIAN MANIPULATION OF LEBANESE EVENTS TO STRENGTHEN SYRIA'S HAND AT PEACE TABLE; (3) EVIDENT SYRIAN POLICY OF BALANCING OFF CHRISTIANS AGAINST MOSLEMS AND VICE VERSA; AND (4) PLO SETBACKS ON FIELD OF BATTLE COMBINED WITH POSSIBLE FACE-SAVING FORMULA FOR PLO IN CONTEXT OF ELBANESE CONFESSIONAL RESTRUCTURING "IMPOSED" BY SYRIANS. THIS THESIS, ADMITTEDLY SPECULATIVE, POSTUATES A CONTINUING KEY SYRIAN ROLE IN LEBANON. IT ALSO INVOLVES AN ULTIMATE DISPOSITION ON PART OF PLO, USG, JORDAN AND IRSael TO ACCEPT ESTABLISHMENT OF PALESTINIAN STATE ON WEST BANK. HOWEVER UNEAL IT MAY APPEAR, SCENARIO WHICH WE UNFOLD SEEMS TO OFFER ONLY POSSIBLE HOPE FOR SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION OF CURRENT LEBANESE PROBLEM.
END SUMMARY.

2. FIGHTING IN LEBANON SHOWS NO PROSPECT OF ENDING SOON AND, IN FACT, DURINGPAST WEEK HAS BECOME EVEN MORE INTENSE. ARAB LEAGUE MEDIATION EFFORTS SEEM DOOMED TO FAILURE. WITH PALESTINIANS RELIGIONAL FRONTS, PLO BACKLASH AGAINST WESTERN INTERESTS IN BEIRUT BECOMES POSSIBILITY. ON GROUND SYRIANS AND CHRISTIANS ARE RIDING HIGH. CHRISTIANS DEMAND PALESTINIAN CAPTULATION AS PRICE FOR PEACE, WHILE MOSLEMS INSIST UPON SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL BEFORE AGREEING TO CEASEFIRE. SYRIANS ARE NOW ENGAGED IN POLICY OF CHOKING OFF BEIRUT IN EFFORT TO BRING PLO AND LEBANESE LEFTISTS TO THEIR
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 BEIRUT 06206 01 OF 02 141306Z

KNEES, AND IN EXTREMIS AN ATTACK ON WEST BEIRUT CANNOT BE PRECLUDED. YET, IT IS PERHAPS POSSIBLE TO IDENTIFY SOME ELEMENTS IN THE SITUATION WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY ARREST THE DOWNWARD SLIDE. FOR THE MOMENT THEY MAY BE ONLY STRAWS IN THE WIND, BUT THEY ARE WORTH LOOKING AT.

3. ISRAELI RESTRAINT. FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE ISRAEL WAS CRATED WE ARE WITNESSING THE SPECTACLE OF AN ARAB STATE

INTERVENING MILITARILY IN LEBANON WITHOUT THE EXPECTED
COUNTERVAILING ISRAELI RESPONSE. ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT SYRIA'S
INTERVENTION, HOWEVER MALADROIT, IS FUNDAMENTALLY IN OUR INTERESTS,
ISRAEL'S DECISION TO REFRAIN FROM CROSSING LEBANESE BORDER IS A
CRUCIAL FACTOR BOTH IN AVOIDING ANOTHER ARAB-ISRAELI WAR AND
IN ENABLING SYRIA TO GO ABOUT ITS TASK OF
"PACIFYING" PALESTINIAN MILITANTS IN LEBANON.
ISRAEL HAS IN EFFECT GIVEN SYRIA THE FLEXIBILITY IT NEEDS TO BRING
THIS FIGHTING TO A CONCLUSION.

4. DOOR REMAINS OPEN FOR PEACE SETTLEMENT. WHAT IS HAPPENING
IN LEBANON COULD CONCEIVABLY CONTRIBUTE TO, RATHER THAN DEROGATE
FROM, MIDDLE EAST PEACE SETTLEMENT. IF SYRIANS SUCCEED IN
ESTABLISHING SOME KIND OF CONTROL OVER PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP AS
RESULT OF THEIR LEBANESE OPERATIONS, SYRIANS MAY FEEL THAT THEY CAN
GO TO CONFERENCE TABLE WITH IMPORTANT BARGAINING CARD. (THIS
ASSUMES, OF COURSE, THAT SYRIANS WANT PEACE SETTLEMENT WITH
ISRAEL.) AT SAME TIME, SERIOUSLY WEAKENED PLO LEAVES PLO LEADERSHIP
WITH CHOICE OF EITHER LOWERING ITS SIGHTS REGARDING ITS BROAD
POLITICAL OBJECTIVES OR BEING SHUNTED ASIDE AS PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT
FURTHER FRAGMENTS. WALID KHALIDI, RESPONSIBLE PALESTINIAN
INTELLECTUAL AND ACQUAINTANCE OF ARAFAT,
EXPRESSES VIEW TO ME THAT ARAFAT--
WHOM HE CHARACTERIZES AS HIGHLY NARCISSISTIC--WANTS BADLY TO
HOLD ON. IF ARAFAT CAN BE GIVEN FACE-SAVING FORMULA TO JUSTIFY
PLO'S CAPITULATION TO SYRIANS, KHALIDI THINKS A WAY OUT OF THE
CURRENT PALESTINIAN-SYRIAN IMPASSE CAN BE FOUND. KHALIDI BELIEVES
THAT PRIMARY REASON FOR PLO'S DOING BATTLE IN LEBANON WAS IN
SUPPORT OF JNBLATT'S OBJECTIVE OF POLITICAL REFORM
ELIMINATING MARONITE DOMINATION. IF NOW ARAFAT CAN BE ASSURED
THAT MARONITES WILL ACCEPT 50-50 SHARING OF POWER (AS AGREED TO IN
FEBRUARY BAABDA DOCUMENT), INSTEAD OF PREVIOUS DISPROPORTIONATE
FORMULA, KHALIDI THINKS THIS MIGHT PROVIDE REQUISITE FACE-SAVER.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 BEIRUT 06206 01 OF 02 141306Z

PROBLEM, OF COURSE, IS THAT CHRISTIANS ARE CURRENTLY LOADED FOR BEAR
AND IN NO MOOD TO COMPROMISE. IF PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP SAW
PROSPECT OF ESTABLISHMENT OF PALESTINIAN STATE SOMEWHERE DOWN THE
PIKE, PALESTINIAN POWDER KEG IN LEBANON WOULD BE EVEN MORE
EFFECTIVELY DEFUSED.

5. MOSLEM-CHRISTIAN BALANCE. ANOTHER POSITIVE ELEMENT IN THE
PICTURE IS THE SYRIAN TACTIC, THUS FAR SUCCESSFUL, OF MAINTAINING
BALANCE OF POWER IN LEBANON AS BETWEEN MOSLEM AND CHRISTIAN
FACTIONS. HAVING FIRST ARMED AND SUPPORTED MOSLEMS AND LEBANESE
LEFTISTS TO POINT WHERE MARONITE CHRISTIANS WERE ON THE SKIDS,
SYRIANS HAVE RECENTLY THROWN WEIGHT ON OTHER SIDE OF EQUATION, TO
EXTENT WHERE MARONITES ARE RIDING HIGH. LATTER HAVE, AS RESULT,
VIRTUALLY ELIMINATED PALESTINIAN PRESENCE IN THEIR ZONE AND MAY NOW
EVEN BE TEMPTED TO TAKE A CRACK AT CROSSING DIVIDING LINE INTO MOSLEM

PART OF BEIRUT. IT WOULD NOT SURPRISE ME IF, BOTH IN PURSUANCE OF ITS
DIVIDE-AND-RULE POLICY AND IN CONNECTION WITH ITS MILITARY SQUEEZE
PPLAY AGAINST PALESTINIANS, SYRIA WERE TO ENDEAVOR ONCE AGAIN TO
REDRESS CURRENT IMBALANCE IN FAVOR OF CHRISTIANS BY MAKING A
GESTURE TOWARD THE OTHER SIDE. (I RECOGNIZE, HOWEVER, AS INDICATED
IN DAMASCUS 4544, THAT THERE IS NO PRESENT INDICATION THAT ASSAD IS
PREPARING TO DO SO.) ONE CONCESSION SYRIANS MIGHT MAKE TO
LEBANESE MOSLEMS IS TO UNDERTAKE TO WITHDRAW UNDER CERTAIN
CONDITIONS. THEIR GESTURE TOWARD PLO COULD, AS KHALIDI SUGGESTS,
BE A SYRIAN UNDERTAKING TO BRING ABOUT A CONFESSIONAL RESTRUCTURING
WHICH WOULD DISADVANTAGE MOSLEMS LESS--WITH SYRIANS USING AS
LEVERAGE WITH MARONITES THREAT OF DISCONTINUATION OOF THEIR CURRENT
SUPPORT (SEE PARA 6). SYRIANS HAVE STOLEN A MARCH FROM FRENCH IN
ADOPTING OLD MANDATE POLICY OF "DIVIDE AND RULE" AND MAY BE
SUCCESSFUL AT IT. (JUNBLATT ALLEGED TO ME THAT ASSAD HAD STATED TO
HIM THAT SYRIA SEEKS TO ASSUME FORMER FRENCH ROLE OF PROTECTOR
OF THE MARONITE COMMUNITY IN LEBANON AND WANTS TO WEAN THEM
AWAY FROM WEST.

NOTE BY OC/T: BEIRUT 6206/1 GARBLED TEXT AS RECEIVED, CORRECTION
TO FOLLOW

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06206 02 OF 02 141318Z

46

ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 AF-08 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 NEAE-00 SSM-03 DHA-02

ORM-02 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00

PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01

SP-02 SS-15 SAM-01 SAB-01 ACDA-07 SCA-01 SCCT-01 A-01

OPR-02 OC-06 CCO-00 OMB-01 SY-05 /117 W

----- 007224

O R 141004Z JUL 76

FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1100

INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

USINT BAGHDAD

AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCEUR
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 6206

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 06206 02 OF 02 141318Z

USCINCEUR FOR POLAD

USDOCSOUTH FOR STODDART, INTAFF

6. MOSLEM ANTIPATHY TOWARD SYRIANS AND GROWING DISAFFECTION WITH PLO. A THIRD POSSIBLE POSITIVE ELEMENT IS INCREASING MOSLEM DISSAFFECTION WITH PLO, AS WELL AS ANTIPATHY TOWARD SYRIANS. WE HAVE REPORTED GROWING MOSLEM RESENTMENT OVER LAST FEW WEEKS REGARDING HIGH-HANDED PLO DOMINATION OF WEST BEIRUT. IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT THIS GROWING RESENTMENT WILL MAKE MOSLEMS--WITH CONSPICUOUS EXCEPTION OF JUNBLATT AND CERTAIN LEFTIST GROUPS--MORE DISPOSED THAN BEFORE TO CIRCUMSCRIBE PLO ACTIVITIES IN LEBANON IN FUTURE. SPIN-OFF EFFECT OF THIS RESENTMENT, TOGETHER WITH MOSLEM DISSATISFACTION WITH SYRIANS, COULD BE A GREATER MOSLEM PRPOENSITY TO RECONCILE THEIR BASIC DIFFERENCES WITH MOARINTE CHRISTIANS. ONE HAS THE FEELING THAT, IF PALESTINIAN FACTOR COULD BE MADE MANAGEABLE, PROSPECTS OF RECONCILAITAION BETWEEN LEBANESE MOSLEMS AND CHRISTIANS ARE PROBABLY BETTER THAN THEY HAVE BEEN FOR MONTHS AT MOMENT WHEN MOSLEMS ARE ANGRY AT SYRIANS AND INCREASINGLY FED UP WITH PALESTINIANS, SYRIANS MAY NOW INITIATE POLICY OF DISTANCING THEMSELVES FROM CHRISTIANS AND START WOONG MOSLEMS (WITHOUT, HOWEVER, SACRIFICING CHRISTIANS). IF THIS HAPPENS, MARONITE CHRISTIANS--SEEING LOOSENING OF ERSTWHILE TIGHT SYRIAN EMBRACE--MIGHT ALSO BRING THEMSELVES TO BURYING HATCHET WITH LEBANESE MOSLEMS. SEVERALLMOSLEM LEADERS HAVE STATED TO ME THAT IF QUESTION OF PALESTINIAN PRESENCE IN LEBANON WERE REGULATED, MOSEMS AND CHRSTIANS WOULD FIND WAY TO LIVE TOGETHER AGAIN.

7. DE FACTO PARTITION. A FOURTH ELEMENT WHICH COULD PROVE HELPFUL, RATHER THAN HARMFUL, IS CURRENT DE FACTO PARTITION OF LEBANON. CONVENTIONAL WISDOM IS TO SAY THAT DE FACTO PARTITION BETWEEN MARONITE CHRISTIANS AND MOSLEM SECTORS IS BAD BECAUSE IT ENHANCES UNDESIRABLE PROSPECT OF PERMANENT PARTITION. A CASE MIGHT BE MADE THAT, NOW THAT MARONITE CHRISTIANS HAVE SUCCEEDED IN VIRTUALLY ELIMINATING PALESTINIANS AS EFFECTIVE FORCE IN MARONITE ZONE, THEY CAN BREATHE MORE FREELY--FEELING SECURE IN THEIR REFUGE. THIS INNER SECURITY MIGHT UNABLE MARONITE LEADERS TO ACT MORE RESPONSIBLY AND LESS EMOTIONALLY. IN THIS SITUATION, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR THEM TO DECIDE THAT SINCE PALESTINIANS NO LONGER CONSTITUTE A DIRECT THREAT TO THEM, THEY CAN AFFORD TO BE MORE SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 BEIRUT 06206 02 OF 02 141318Z

TOLERANT OF MODUS VIVENDI SYRIANS NEGOTIATE WITH PALESTINIANS, PROVIDED SYRIANS UNDERTAKE TO KEEP PALESTINIANS UNDER CONTROL. (IN ANY CASE, MARONITE REALISTS MUST KNOW THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO EXPEL THE MORE THAN 350,000 PALESTINIANS FROM LEBANON.) MARONITES ALSO KNOW THAT DE FACTO PARTITION OFFERS THEM A BARGAINING CARD WITH LEBANESE MOSLEMS. MOSLEMS ARE NOW REALISTICALLY AND FOR FIRST TIME FACED WITH POSSIBLE AND UNPALATABLE ALTERNATIVE OF DEJURE PARTITION, WHICH IS LIKELY TO HURT THE LESS ENTERPRISING MOSLEMS MORE THAN CHRISTIANS. IN RETURN FOR RECONCILIATION WITH MARONITES, MOSLEMS CAN ONCE AGAIN BECOME PART OF A VIBRANT AND DYNAMIC SOCIETY. TRBQE IS, AS NOTED ABOVE, THERE ARE NO PRESENT SIGNS OF MARONITE CHRISTIAN DISPOSITION TO MAKE CONCESSIONS, BUT THEN SYRIANS HAVEN'T TURNED THE SCREW.

8. ACCORDINGLY, ALTHOUGH IT IS DIFFICULT TO BE OPTIMISTIC THAT LEBANESE SITUATION IS GOING TO IMPROVE, ONE SHOULD NOT RPT NOT TOTALLY EXCLUDE POSSIBILITY THAT PHENOMENA DISCUSSED ABOVE COULD CONCEIVABLY LEAD TO WAY OUT OF CURRENT IMPASSE ONCE PLO IS LICKED ON FIELD OF BATTLE. CERTAIN BASIC POLITICAL DECISIONS, SUCH AS FUNDAMENTAL SOCIAL REFORM IN LEBANON MAY WELL HAVE TO BE POSTPONED UNTIL THE FUTURE. AND SYRIAN OCCUPATION OF MUCH OF LEBANON WOULD NO DOUBT CONTINUE FOR INDEFINITE PERIOD. BUT A SYRIAN-IMPOSED CEASEFIRE, BULWARKED BY A SYRIAN UNDERTAKING TO GIVE PLO A FACE-SAVING WAY OUT, MIGHT OFFER US A BREATHING SPELL.

9. IF THIS SHOULD HAPPEN, U.S. GOVERNMENT COULD HELP SITUATION BY REVIEWING ITS CURRENT POSITION OF HOLDING PALESTINE QUESTION TO LAST IN PEACEMAKING PROCESS AND CONSIDER ADDRESSING PROPOSITION THAT CREATION OF PALESTINIAN STATE ON WEST BANK SHOULD BECOME A PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF U.S. POLICY. BY HOLDING OUT TO PALESTINIANS PROSPECT OF SUCH A STATE, U.S. COULD CONTRIBUTE SIGNIFICANTLY TO EASING PALESTINIAN PRESSURES IN LEBANON. CONVINCING ISRAEL, TO LESSER EXTENT JORDAN AND EVEN PLO OF DESIRABILITY OF THIS OBJECTIVE IS NO MEAN TASK, BUT IF U.S. WERE TO TAKE THE LEAD--EVEN IF ONLY AT FIRST IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF ADVOCACY--PALESTINIANS COULD BE OFFERED

ANOTHER USEFUL FACE-SAVING FORMULA FOR BACKING DOWN IN LEBANON.

10. EVEN IF SYRIANS SUCCEED IN NEUTRALIZING PLO, THEY WILL FACE
NUMBER OF PROBLEMS. LEBANESE LEFTISTS AND REJECTION FRONT WILL
NOT BE EASILY SWUNG INTO LINE. MARONITE CHRISTIANS, FLUSHED WITH
VICTORY, ARE GOING TO HAVE TO CLIMB DOWN FROM THEIR HIGH HORSE.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 BEIRUT 06206 02 OF 02 141318Z

MASS OF ARMS HELD BY MOST OF POPULATION WILL BE CONTINUING
DESTABILIZING FACTOR. LASTING EFFECTIVE SECURITY WILL ONLY COME
WHEN LEBANESE ARMY IS RECREATED AND GIVEN SOME TEETH. IN THE
INTERIM, A CEASEFIRE WOULD HAVE TO BE PRESERVED BY COMBINATION
OF SYRIAN TROOPS, ARAB LEAGUE FORCE (MAYBE STRENGTHENED BY
EGYPTIAN TANKS) AND, PERHAPS, SECURITY ELEMENTS OF A CONVERTED
PLO. A SYRIAN-
EGYPTIAN RECONCILIATION IN THIS PROCESS
WOULD APPEAR TO BE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT.

11. FOREGOING IS VERY SPECULATIVE, BUT IT REPRESENTS AN EFFORT
TO SEE A POSSIBLE SILVER LINING.
SEELYE

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, INTERVENTION, MUTUAL FORCE WITHDRAWALS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 14 JUL 1976
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: KelleyW0
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976BEIRUT06206
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D760273-0164
From: BEIRUT
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760761/aaaacbmt.tel
Line Count: 356
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION NEA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: KelleyW0
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 26 APR 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <26 APR 2004 by buchant0>; APPROVED <17 AUG 2004 by KelleyW0>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: POSSIBLE SILVER LINING IN CONNECTION WITH CURRENT LEBANESE SITUATION
TAGS: PFOR, PINS, PINT, MILI, LE, SY
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006